carried into his work: 'it was religiously my duty that my existing and my existing as an author express the truth, which I had daily perceived and ascertained--that there is a God.' 3 That having been said, there are areas in his thought that seem to disregard the external reality of God and his continuing engagement with history. 4 When reading through these sections, there is room to misinterpret Kierkegaard's vision of Christianity in terms that fail to distinguish it decisively from immanent accounts of Christianity: Christianity that is grounded in a person's subjective commitment to her own understanding of what Christianity is--an understanding that is possessed within the mind of the human believer and which can be held in abstraction from the gracious activity of the divine subject. On this view, Christianity, above all else, concerns an individual's belief in her own perception of God, informed, for example, by her own reflection on
Scripture. Under these circumstances, the Christian is not primarily oriented toward the eternal truth (God) that always transcends her existence and which can only be received derivatively from the divine-human mediator of that truth. Instead, the 'essence' of the Christian task, as Clare Carlisle contends, primarily involves a passionate and active relationship to a person's own idea of its absolute telos: a relationship in which the Christian actively repeats in her existence that which she professes in her relationship with God. 5 In these terms, the decisive becoming of the Christian life concerns a process of self-transformation that takes place in response to the truth that is given in 4 This is particularly evident in Kierkegaard's earlier pseudonymous works, which, as I note in footnote 19 below, should not be attributed to Kierkegaard. That said, a disregard for the external reality of God is also evident in some of Kierkegaard's own signed works, particularly in those discourses that Howard and Edna Hong gathered together in Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses. Consequently, as I note in footnote 52 below, Kierkegaard's pseudonym, Johannes Climacus did not consider these discourses to be decisively Christian. 5 Clare Carlisle, 'Climacus on the task of becoming a Christian' in Concluding Unscientific Postscript: A Critical Guide, ed. Rick Furtak (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 185. Here, Carlisle also contends that 'Kierkegaard's analysis of the Christian task in the Postscript is characterized by an absolute refusal… to think beyond existence.' (185).
4
Christ and continues to have no reality apart from the person of Jesus Christ. 9 This means that human thought cannot abstract the essential truth of the incarnation from the person of Christ and appropriate it into a human message about the unity of God and humanity. It also means that while the absolute paradox of the incarnation was logically possible, to the extent that God could create it, the union that Jesus Christ establishes was not actual until the event of its happening.
What does this imply? Kierkegaard is emphatic that individuals cannot mediate the truth of
Christianity to themselves in and through their own autonomous understanding--their own absolutely different understanding. Individuals cannot relate to the essential truth of Christianity by simply reflecting on some (scripturally, doctrinally, or otherwise-informed) notion of Christianity.
The essential truth of Christianity is not simply "a truth" that needs to be recollected (i.e. a comprehensible idea of God or the God-human). Furthermore, the Christian truth is not simply the paradoxical idea of unity between eternality and temporality (i.e. an incomprehensible idea that needs to be embraced against the understanding). The essential truth of Christianity is the personal reality of the living God who enters into time as a particular human being and thereby establishes a totally unique kinship (Slaegtskab) between God and humanity: that is, a relationship in which God relates to human beings by sharing with them in their flesh and blood (Heb. 2:14). 10 It is only in and through the eternal-historical person of Jesus Christ that God positively mediates the eternal truth of who God is to humanity. Kierkegaard writes, 9 Indeed, there is a sense in which the God-human union (Eenhed), which is created in the incarnation, is 'something new for God. ' 10 This description of kinship corresponds to Kierkegaard's account of the incarnate God's relationship to us in his discourse on the High Priest (Heb. 4:25): 'We have not a high priest who is unable to have sympathy with our weaknesses, but one who has been tested in all things in the same way, yet without sin.' (SKS 11, 251-59 / Without Authority, ed. and trans. Howard V. and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 113-24). That said, Kierkegaard does not directly refer to the term 'kinship' (or Slaegtskab) in this discourse.
A Mediator is necessary for me, among other reasons, simply to make me aware that it is God with whom, as we say, I have the honor of speaking; otherwise a man can easily live on in the indolent conceit that he is talking with God, whereas he is only talking with himself.
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In Jesus Christ, the living God reveals himself to the world in a way that makes it possible for human beings to share in an interpersonal relationship with God. Within this relationship a person is nurtured and maintained in her faithfulness by the grace of God: she actively responds to
God because God actively involves himself in her life, governing her and transforming her into a person who can live according to God's (incarnate) truth.
What we find in Kierkegaard's Christian thought is a twofold account of how God relates to persons in time. First, God creates an eternal-historical union with human beings in and through the person of Jesus Christ. By assuming our humanity, God relates to persons in the temporality of their human situation. 12 Second, following the crucifixion, the risen and ascended Christ continues to relate to persons spiritually: that is, by way of a gracious activity and presence that comes to us from beyond our physical existence but yet maintains the kinship that was created in the (1) grounded in the kinship that God establishes with the world in and through the incarnation, and (2) maintained by the ascended God-human's spiritual activity.
14 By participating in an interactive relationship with God, a person receives the faith to make sense of her life in such a way that any apparent absurdity surrounding the incarnation ceases to be perceived as such.
When the believer has faith, the absurd is not the absurd--faith transforms it, but in every weak moment it is again more or less absurd to him. The passion of faith is the only thing which masters the absurd-if not, then faith is not faith in the strictest sense, but a kind of knowledge. 16 In this friendship, a person becomes so consumed by a love for God that she becomes 'blind' to any apparent intellectual difficulties that are involved in recognising the possibility of a relationship between 'two qualities so unlike as God and man'--a relationship, moreover, that is mediated by the God-man. 17 This does not mean that she becomes blind to the truth. Rather, she is awakened by the truth to the truth. As the one who is the truth, the God-human makes sense of her existence despite the fact that she cannot unravel the mystery of the incarnation. As this happens, the reality of Jesus Christ calls into question any brazen concern for intellectual mastery.
In sum, Jesus Christ does not encounter persons as a puzzle to be solved. But neither does he encounter persons as an abstract reality to be blindly embraced. Rather, he confronts persons as the one who calls them to discipleship. Jesus offers an invitation for persons to come to love and follow him. And he does this as the light of the world who bestows truth upon human knowing. When a person stands before God, awakened by his truth, she subordinates herself, not simply to a paradox that immediately seems unfathomable but to the living God who, by establishing kinship with human persons in time, lovingly draws her to himself and into the truth that he is in himself. At the same time, Kierkegaard also sought to challenge the ways in which the cultural and intellectual elite in Denmark were distorting "Christianity" to fit to their own particular interests and agendas. According to their brand of "Christianity", the truth of the Christian faith was something to be discovered by way of a scholarly devotion to Christian doctrine and teaching. In order to challenge this perception, Kierkegaard created a character who was able to speak to the rationalists on their own terms: Johannes Climacus. What the non-Christian Climacus was able to do (and to question them in ways that penetrated their speculative strategies and challenged them to rethink how they were relating to Christianity. He was, in effect, playing them at their own game: by exposing the limits of their position via their own methods.
In this way, he questioned their unyielding confidence in the powers of immanent reason and opened the doors to the suggestion that the truth is to be found through a relationship with God, who is beyond the scope of unredeemed human reason--God, who cannot be conjured up within the mind's own resources, that is, by philosophical argumentation or analysis. By presenting them with this alternative, Kierkegaard and Climacus were able to draw attention to the essential supposition of the Gospel, namely, that it is God's Son who makes God known (John 1:18). For Kierkegaard,
God is known in and through the reconciliation of our minds which takes place in Jesus Christ who is the way, the truth and the life--and who thus constitutes, in himself, the condition whereby we are brought into relationship with the truth. This involves the reorientation of our focus back to the one who alone can draw persons into the Christian life.
By using Climacus to converse with the intellectuals of his day, Kierkegaard translated the "what" of Christianity into a message that related (albeit challengingly) to the subjective mindset of a particular people. Again, however, he did so with an acute awareness that his "translation" of the Gospel could only go so far. He did not for a moment believe that he could employ his intellectual powers of persuasion to bring people closer to God and enable them to become Christian. He could not translate the presence of God to people, and so could not draw persons into the spiritual relationship with God that is decisive for coming to faith. He sought instead to undercut the intellectual foundations that were strengthening resistance to the possibility that the truth is to be found through a relationship with God who is external to us. In so doing, he created an opportunity to focus again on the revelation that alone defines what Christianity is.
Kierkegaard's concern to shift the focus to God's self-revelation in Jesus Christ is central to what Climacus is doing in Concluding Unscientific Postscript, particularly when it comes to his distinguishing Christianity from immanent forms of religiousness. As Kierkegaard seeks to show through the writings of Climacus, there is an absolute difference between human ideas of Jesus
Christ and the divine-human reality of Jesus Christ: the latter is united with God himself, the former is not. For this reason, the Christian faith cannot be maintained without a relationship with Jesus
Christ. If a person forgets this, she will lose sight of her need for grace and will start (consciously or unconsciously) looking to herself for upbuilding. Unfaithfully, she will turn inward to her own christology rather than to the reality of Jesus Christ. Consequently, she will become lost for the simple reason that, for Kierkegaard, it is not theology that leads a person to God but 'the Mediator':
it is 'Christ who leads us to God… by means of the Spirit'. By recognising Kierkegaard's emphasis on this point, the theological and philosophical world is required to rethink what it means to caricature Kierkegaard as the "father of existentialism". Moreover, as this essay will seek to demonstrate, it is not only Kierkegaard's later more robustly theological works that call for a change in this prevailing perception. This call is also prompted by Concluding Unscientific Postscript, a work that has tended to further the perception of Kierkegaard as a primarily "existentialist" thinker, and thereby compromise his reception as an orthodox Christian thinker--a thinker whose vision of Christianity is much more theocentric and Christocentric than it is anthropocentric.
Immanent Religiousness and Christianity
Throughout the vast majority of Postscript, we are given an account of religiousness that concerns the individual's pathos-filled relation to an eternal happiness. This religiousness revolves around an individual's infinite interest in the god (Guden) and the eternal. Towards the end of Postscript, Climacus identifies this category of religiousness as immanent religiousness, immediate religiousness or religiousness A. While this category of religiousness stresses humanity's absolute alienation from God and the eternal, it also recognises the possibility of a person being able to relate to God by virtue of her own immanent capacities, for example, through a consciousness of guilt. In this respect, Climacus contends, immanent religiousness is qualitatively distinct from the religiousness of Christianity, which denies the possibility of a person being able to relate personally to God by way of her own immanent capacities. 26 This, however, is a bold contention that needs careful qualification. It is imperative, therefore, that we examine the nature of this distinction who leads to the Father; no, it is the Father who directs to the Son, the Son who directs to the Spirit, and not until then is it the Spirit who leads to the Son and the Son who leads to the Father.' 26 See SKS 7, 528 / CUP, 579-80.
closely--given, not least, Kierkegaard's description of Postscript as the turning point in his whole authorship. Climacus writes,
The religiousness that has been discussed up until now and that for the sake of brevity will from now on be termed Religiousness A is not the specifically Christian religiousness.
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Before turning to consider the precise nature of this distinction, it should be noted that Although these Christian facts can be taken as references to Christianity, as we shall see, they can only be taken as decisively Christian if they inhere in and are derived from the 'something historical' upon which the Christian's eternal happiness is based in truth (SKS 7, 336-7 / CUP, 369). The reason for this is that they also constitute ideas that can be imaginatively constructed and related to in untruth. For Climacus, Christian concepts are not, in and of themselves, essentially Christian (which is why he did not describe his imaginative construction in Fragments as 'Christianity'). (See SKS 7, 330 / CUP, 361-2). As such, when Climacus puts forward an idea about what is essentially Christian ('that an eternal happiness is decided in time in relation to something historical'), this idea is not in itself essentially Christian because, quite simply, the idea itself cannot be the 'something historical' that is decisive for the Christian faith. In short, the decisively Christian cannot be derived from universal ideas about its substance. The Christian faith does not primarily concern a particular individual's infinite interest in God, but concerns God himself reconciling particular individuals into faith. 29 Accordingly, I would argue that it is an overstatement for Ingolf Dalferth to affirm that 'the argument in the Postscript depends from the first to the last page on the priority of God's creative grace over our ways of receiving it'. 30 Indeed, Climacus writes, 'Religiousness A must first be present in the individual before there can be any consideration of becoming aware of the dialectical B. When the individual in the most decisive expression of existential pathos relates himself to an eternal happiness, then there can be consideration of becoming aware of how the dialectical in second place (secundo loco) thrusts him down into the pathos of the absurd. Thus it is evident how foolish it is if a person without pathos wants to relate himself to the essentially Christian, because before there can be any question at all of simply being in the situation of becoming aware of it one must first of all exist in religiousness A.' (SKS 7, 505-6 / CUP, 556-7.) If a person is to become a Christian, on Climacus' account, she cannot merely study Christianity as an objective observer. She must become personally interested in God. She must give him the kind of attention that we find in the pathos-filled subjectivity of Religiousness A: she must humbly approach him as God, before whom she has nothing to offer except her need for him. Simply doing this, however, will not itself bring a person any closer to the true God. But Climacus does suggest that this move can provide the 'impetus' for God then, in second place, to deliver that person into the Christian faith. (SKS 7, 508-9 / CUP, 559-60) ' [T]he god [Guden] rescues from delusion the person who in quiet inwardness and honest before God is concerned for himself; even though he is ever so simple, the god leads him in the suffering of inwardness to the truth.' (SKS 7, 559 / CUP, 615 The "Socratic secret", 15). Religiousness A, she interprets, is not merely a leaping off point but a stage of existence that continues to play an active role in a person's Christian faith. ('The "Socratic secret", 18). She supports this with Climacus' affirmation that 'every Christian has pathos as in religiousness A'. (SKS 7, / CUP, 582). Furthermore, she also takes Climacus' description of Christian pathos as a 'sharpening pathos' to imply that, in conversion, 'the original pathos is not annihilated. (SKS 7, / CUP, 582; 'The "Socratic secret", 21-22). In light of these and a few other references, she notes that the Christian faith does not require 'a break with human existing, but an accentuation of human existing.' ('The "Socratic secret", 21). Human existence is transformed, heightened and deepened rather than replaced. ('The "Socratic secret"', 19-21). Concluding her discussion, she remarks, 'Climacus' whole motivation was to reawaken people who had forgotten "what it is to live as a human being"--surely, we are not asked to forget that when we become Christian.' ('The "Socratic secret"', 22-23).
There are many respects in which I am happy to agree with Ferreira's argument. Climacus does indeed provide a more existential account of Christianity in Postscript than he does in Fragments. By so doing, he sought to challenge the lacklustre "Christianity" of Christendom and stress that 'Being a Christian is defined not by the "what" of Christianity but by the "how" of the Christian.' (SKS 7, 554 / CUP, 610). This meant not only emphasising the grace of God in the Christian life but also stressing that the Christian must strive to live in a way that takes her relationship with God seriously. The Christian must approach God with the existential pathos of Religiousness A: she must interpret her relationship with God as her eternal happiness, must commit her life to worshipping God and do so with an understanding that she is nothing before God. The Christian must think about what it means to be a Christian and struggle to act accordingly. And when she does so, it is not simply the grace of God within her. There is an extent to which her struggle to obey God arises with her own immanent struggle to obey God; there is an extent to which her Christian understanding of God arises with her own immanent understanding of God; and there is an extent to which her Christian passion for God arises with her own immanent passion for God. To become a Christian, for Climacus, a person needs to grapple with the call of Christianity to die to the world and die to the self. By drawing on the importance of the Christian taking her relationship with God seriously (with the pathos of Religiousness A), Climacus does not, however, as I argue here, set aside the irreconcilable differences between Religiousness A and Christianity. As we shall see, Climacus is adamant that whereas Religiousness A is conditioned by a person's own inward deepening in relation to an eternal happiness, Christianity is based upon the 'God in time as an individual human being' who, as 'something outside himself', qualifies a person's eternal happiness 'more specifically'. (SKS 7, 510, 505 / CUP, 561n., 556).
Ferreira does not deny a qualitative discontinuity between A and B in Postscript. ('The "Socratic secret"', 23). My concern, however, is that she neglects the decisiveness of God's historical actuality for Christian existence: that the point of departure for the Christian existence is a historical relationship with the real God in time. In her reading, it appears that a person's transition into Religiousness B involves the transforming and deepening of a person's original existence. God provides the world with a qualitatively specific revelation of sin and forgiveness that is then able to inform a person's immanent relation to an eternal happiness, giving it a qualitatively new content. ('The "Socratic secret"', 22.) 32 Ferreira, 'The "Socratic secret"', 22. In the thought experiment of Philosophical Fragments, Climacus associates the passion of faith with the 'condition' for understanding the truth that the god provides (SKS 4, 261 / PF, 59). The god who provides this condition is the servant god: 'god's presence is not incidental to his teaching but is essential. The presence of the god in human form -indeed, in the lowly form of a servant -is precisely the teaching, and the god himself must provide the condition; otherwise the learner is unable to understand anything.' (SKS 4, 258 / PF, 55). When we take this into account, we see that Climacus is of the view that faith arises in the moments in which the human learner passionately encounters and actively relates to the god in human form. When we consider that the object of faith is not merely an abstract paradox but the god-human, it becomes evident that a person's relationship to the truth is essentially an outward personal relationship-a relationship established in the external presence of the god in human form. In this relationship, a person's self-understanding steps aside and the servant god gives himself. And, in this relationship, faith arises as the "third something" that is constituted by the passionate relationship between the person and the god in human form. (SKS 4, 261 / PF, 59).
It is precisely because the Christian truth is grounded in the reality of the god in time that
Climacus refers to Christian existence as "paradoxical-religiousness": it is a category of existence that is grounded in a relationship with that which 'cannot be thought'. 58 The 'something outside himself' to which the Christian relates himself is not merely relatively difficult to comprehend--like 'a relative paradox, which höchstens [at best] can be thought with difficulty'. 59 Rather, it is an absolute contradiction for human understanding precisely because it transcends the boundaries of immanent human thought. To clarify, the reality of the eternal God stands in radical (or 'absolute') contradiction to any perception of God or Christ that autonomous human reason can come up with through its own process of self-reflection. Whereas the former reality is the true God, the latter concept is one that can be found in any form of paganism.
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How, then, can a person relate to God? For Climacus and Kierkegaard, God interacts with a person spiritually: that is, with an entirely new spiritual activity that cannot be reduced to a person's own immanent spirituality. Through God's incarnate and spiritual presence, human subjects can come to relate positively to God. Under these circumstances, the person who becomes a Christian cannot look backward to try and work out speculatively how she came to relate herself to the eternal: for example, by reflecting on her upbringing in a Christian home. Such a move, would involve a person trying to reduce her conversion to an immanent progression, thereby setting aside her transformative encounter(s) with God in time. Instead, she must look forward in her journey with God in time, embracing the fact that, as a Christian, she now consciously participates in a 58 SKS 7, 510 / CUP, 561. 59 SKS 7, 510 / CUP, 561. 60 SKS 7, 508 / CUP, 559. Climacus writes, "The basis of the misunderstanding is that, despite the use of Christ's name etc., Christianity has been shoved back into the esthetic… where the incomprehensible is the relatively incomprehensible (relative either with regard to its not yet having been understood or to the need for a seer with an eagle eye to understand it), which in time has its explanation in something higher behind itself, rather than in Christianity's being an existence-communication that makes existing paradoxical, which is why it remains the paradox as long as there is existing and only eternity has the explanation." (SKS 7, 511-2 / CUP, 562). In what sense, then, does Christianity go 'against the understanding'? 68 For Climacus, the such, he cannot recognise the truth of Christianity for himself. What this means is that becoming a Christian is not a possibility, therefore, for which a person can prepare herself mentally. Any empirical, imaginative and/or speculative attempts to come to terms with Christianity for oneself can only ever come up with a false imitation--a "Christianity" that has been chopped and changed according to the Procrustean bed of a particular person's finite understanding. Christianity stands in radical contradiction to any supposition that the understanding could potentially come up with for itself, for example, by examining Scripture and trying to construct or imagine the God to whom it testifies. to a human being in a miracle; that is, as soon as he sees God, he sees a miracle.' 71 Therefore, there is no do-it-yourself Christianity. Indeed, for Climacus, the do-it-yourself attitude of the creature's understanding itself needs to be 'crucified' to make way for a faith that sees God as awakening any
Christian understanding within us.
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That being said, this does not mean that the miracle of God encountering persons goes against human understanding per se. Rather, it deepens, transforms and thereby satisfies the desire for understanding in ways that are more profound than we could ever envisage in advance.
When God draws a person to himself, he reconciles her mind such that it corresponds to the truth that God is in himself. In and through this, the Christian relates to God with a faith that does not repose in her immediate grasp of things but, counterintuitively, finds understanding in the 'absolute paradox' of God's being with us in time. 73 In this way, her immediate understanding is displaced in order to make way for Jesus Christ who alone makes Christianity a possibility.
Accordingly, her understanding does not default to its more natural responses. It does not, for example, (1) try to explain away the absolute paradox; (2) try to go around the absolute paradox to know God behind the absolute paradox; or (3) take offense and deny the absolute paradox. Instead, a person's understanding humbly recognises the priority of the eternal God and his self-revelation in time: the priority that the absolute paradox has over a person's immediate understanding. By so doing, the human understanding conforms to the reality of God rather than the other way round. 73 To clarify, the Christian faith should not be understood as a way of knowing in which God grants persons the ability to understand and master Christianity for themselves; that is, by giving them some cognitive condition to know the truth of Christianity self-evidently. Rather, Christian existence is maintained by an ongoing relationship with God. That is, by participating in a relationship that is itself maintained through the momentary interactions between divine and human agency--through a tapestry of divine communication and human reception, divine enabling and human awakening.
It is not possible to grasp the full implications of Kierkegaard's Christian realism without appreciating a further key element in Climacus's argument. The enemy of Christian realism is sin--sin, indeed, which all too easily takes the form of guilt-consciousness. If a person is to become a Christian, she must become conscious of her alienation from God, that is, of her sin. What Climacus and Kierkegaard see with such clarity is that this is profoundly different from a consciousness of guilt.
How does Climacus interpret guilt-consciousness? In his account of immanent religiousness, Climacus notes that the finite religious believer is unable to resign herself absolutely to God.
Moreover, she cannot even properly acknowledge her absolute dependence upon God: she will always fail to become 'absolutely captive in the absolute conception of God'. 79 She is, therefore, doomed to failure. Aware of this failure, she withdraws to the decisive expression of religiousness:
Guilt-consciousness. With guilt-consciousness, a person construes her failure to live out the religious life in terms of a "disrelation" (Misforholdet) to her eternal happiness, which is able to inspire a life of continual repentance. 80 By judging herself as guilty in her failure to relate to God, the religious believer expresses that she is relating herself to an eternal happiness (albeit negatively), and recognizes herself as a person who stands before God (albeit absolutely distantly hand, she cannot truly know Jesus Christ unless she has the sin-conscious faith to access this truththe consciousness that, apart from Christ, she exists in untruth. Although the pseudonymous 82 For Climacus, the individual is 'unable to gain the consciousness of sin by himself, which is the case with guiltconsciousness, because in guilt-consciousness the subject's self-identity is preserved, and guilt-consciousness is a change of the subject within the subject himself. The consciousness of sin, however, is a change of the subject himself, which shows that outside the individual there must be the power that makes clear to him that he has become a person other than he was by coming into existence, that he has become a sinner.' (SKS 7, 532 / CUP, 584 
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With these words, Kierkegaard dismisses any notion that sin-consciousness is a legal move that a person needs to make in advance in order to participate in a relationship with God. That is, although he views sin-consciousness as a subjective requirement for the Christian faith, he sees it as one that can only arise through God's relating to us in Christ. Apart from God, a person can neither know nor love God, and, therefore, cannot become conscious of the sin that opposes God's love. 91 
Repentance
The reason that it is so easy to make the mistake of thinking that individuals are independently responsible for becoming conscious of sin is because it involves a transformation of the individual in response to a reality that cannot be directly observed. Another essential facet of the Christian faith that is easily misconstrued in this way is repentance. The church has often reduced repentance to a legal step that a person needs to make (in advance) in order to participate in a loving relationship with God--as opposed to a response that a person makes as she is given to become aware of God's love and thus participate in it. This vision of repentance has arisen by deconstructing the interpersonal dynamic between God and humanity--by examining the activity of the two sides of this relationship separately--in order to develop a step-by-step guide on how to become a Christian. But there is a love with which I love God, and this love has only one expression in language--it is "repentance." If I do not love him in this way, then I do not love him absolutely, for I love out of necessity. As soon as I love freely and love God, then I repent. And if there were no other basis for repentance as the expression of my love of God, it is this--that he has loved me first.
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Although Kierkegaard does not locate the heart of Christian repentance in individual speech or action, he does acknowledge that genuine repentance will entail sorrow over one's sin--sorrow for a life lived, and to some extent still lived, in offense against God. Furthermore, because he holds human beings personally responsible for sin, he affirms that Christian repentance demands not only the 'agony of sin-consciousness; but also the "anguish of a contrite conscience", which, to an extent, means a consciousness of guilt'. 97 He further describes repentance as the burdening concern that is required by the gospel's invitation to "Come here to me, all who labor and are burdened, and I will give you rest" (Matt. 11:28). 98 He does not suggest, however, that the individual is to dwell despairingly on her guilt. As a Lutheran, he merely affirms that honest repentance will be characterized by a heartfelt sorrow--by an attitude with which a person turns to God for rest. Again, however, there is no extent to which the penitent's sorrow can be seen to counteract her sin. The penitent Christian cannot, for Kierkegaard, be perceived as paying for her sin with the anguish of a contrite conscience. One could even go so far as to say that any repentant activity on the individual's part will be so inadequate (as a human act) that it will itself require repentance. This is again because, apart from Christ, all human activity falls infinitely short of the glory of God.
Objectively speaking, Christian repentance depends wholly upon Christ and what he has achieved for the world in the atonement. Subjectively speaking, repentance transpires by becoming conscious of one's need for grace in and through the gracious presence of God.
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Conclusion
The Christian can never, for Kierkegaard, be certain that she is decisively Christian because her understanding cannot capture the reality of the divine subject who determines the actuality of her 
